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BILLS AND NOTEs-REACQUISITION AND REISSUE BY A PRIOR p ARTYLIABILITY OF INTERMEDIATE INDORSER TO SUBSEQUENT HOLDER IN DUE
COURSE-The payee of a negotiable note indorsed to X, who later indorsed
back to the payee, who before maturity indorsed to a holder in due course.
All indorsements were special. On default, the holder brought suit to enforce
the secondary liability of the payee and X, the intermediate indorser. Both defendants appealed from a judgment for the holder. Held, reversed as to X. The
reacquisition of a note by a payee terminates the contractual liability of an
intermediate indorser as to a holder subsequent to the payee. Dennisto-ds Admr.
v. lackson, 304 Ky. 261, 200 S.W. (2d) 477 (1947).
The status of a payee 1 who reacquire!; a negotiable instrument, and of
holders who take subsequent to such reacquisition, may be analyzed in either of
two ways. The reacquisition may be treated as a reinstatement of the party in
his former position, all intermediate indorsements being nullified, in legal contemplation. The payee is said to stand in his "old shoes," and this theory has

1 While the term "payee" is used in this note to indicate the reacquiring party, it
should be observed that the status of a reacquiring subsequent holder is for most pur- _
poses indistinguishable. Contra, by construction of N.I.L., section 58 (cited in footnote 3, infra): Horan v. Mason, 141 App. Div. 89, 125 N.Y.S. 668 (1910). See
Brannan, "Some Necessary Amendments of the Negotiable Instruments Law," 26
HARV. L. REV. 493 (1913). For a discussion of the status of an instrument reaoquired by the party primarily liable, see L.R.A. 1918 E, 170.
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sometimes been so named. On the other hand, the payee may be treated as a
purchaser acquiring a new title which is traced through intermediate indorsements as well as his own prior indorsement.2 The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law cannot be said to have adopted either theory in toto. In view of the
dissimilarity of the problems raised in this situation, consistency of approach
should be regarded as a matter of slight importance. In general, there are two
classes of cases in which the question is raised. One involves the right of a reacquiring party or subsequent holder to enforce the obligation of the party primarily liable on the instrument, free of defenses of such party because of the
bona fides of an intermediate holder. This problem is covered, inconsistently
it may be, by section 58 8 and section I 2 I ,4 although the sections may be harmonized. G The policy of the law is to grant to a holder in due course as broad
a market 'as possible, despite the later discovery of defect in the title, without
allowing recovery to a fraudulent party. Since section 58 does not protect the
holder's market in respect to a purchaser, himself a party to any fraud or illegality-, it may )Vell be that a subsequent holder from such purchaser will not be
protected if he is not himself a holder in due course. 6 A second class of cases, to
which the principal case belongs, raises the question of the liability of the intermediate indorser after reacquisition of the instrument by a prior party.7 As to
such prior party himself, section 50 clearly applies the "old shoes" theory. From
-the language of the section as well as from the history of the rule at common
law,8 the rule is aimed at preventing circuity of action and does not express any
2
An extended treatment of the two theories, beyond the scope of the present note,
will be found in Chafee, "The Reacquisition of Negotiable Instruments by a Prior
Party," 21 CoL. L. REV. 538 (1921).
8
"In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable. But a holder who
derives his title through a holder in due course, and who is not himself a party to any
fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, has all the rights of such former holder in
respect of all parties prior to the latter."
~ "Where the instrument is paid by a party secondarily liable thereon, it is not
discharged; but the party so paying it is remitted to his former rights as regards all
. parties.
. • • •''
prior
G Use of the word "paid" strongly suggests that section 121 applies only in cases
of negotiation after maturity, by virtue of section 88, defining payment in due course.
But see Chafee, "The Reacquisition of Negotiable Instruments by a Prior Party," 21
CoL. L. REv. 538 (1921).
6
To this effect see Comstock v. Buckley, 141 Wis. 228, 124 N.W. 414 (1910);
Booher v. Allen, 153 Mo. 613, 55 S.W. 238 (1900); Weil v. Carswell, 119 Ga. 873,
47 S.E. 217 (1904). To the effect that the same theory was applied to chattels, see
The W. B. Cole, (C.C.A. 6th, 1893) 59 F. 182. See also BEUTEL, BRANNAN's NEcoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw ANNOTATED 713 et seq. (1938).
7 The problem of liability on indorsement may be considered as separable from the
problem of taking free of defenses, except perhaps where a maker's defense is added
to the facts of the instant case. If the plaintiff here had been granted recovery against
the intermediate indorser, the latter in turn could recover from the maker free of
defenses, and thus the original plaintiff could in effect reach the maker in two steps
and accomplish what might be impossible-in one. (See note 6, supra.)
8
Bishop v. Hayward, 4 T.R. 470, 100 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1791); Britten v. Webb,
2 B. & C. 483, 107 Eng. Rep. 463 (1824); Sawyer v. Wiswell, 9 Allen (91 Mass.) 39
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presumption that the intermediate parties took only for security and indorsed•
in return without intending to incur liability. It should follow, therefore, that a
holder in due course, who was not a prior party himself, but who took from
a reacquiring party, is not within the rationale of section 50 but is rather entitled by section 5 7 to take free of "defenses available to prior parties among
themselves." 9 Such holder is of course charged by the order of the indorsements
with knowledge that the reacquiring party may not enforce the instrument
against intermediate indorsers, but to argue that he is thereby charged with
knowledge that he may not himself so enforce the instrument is to assume the
issue in controversy. Nevertheless, the authorities are in conflict, both at common law 10 and under the N.I.L.11 The court in the principal case did not
consider the effect of section 48, which grants the holder an election to strike out
indorsements unnecessary to his chain of title. This suggests that the payee
takes as a purchaser from an int~rmediate indorser unless the payee elects reinstatement to his former position. It will be seen that the decision in the instant
case removes any possibility of election in the case of the reacquiring party.
It is submitted that there is no valid reason for terminating the contractual
obligation voluntarily 12 assumed by an indorser, where nothing more appears
than that the instrument in subsequent negotiation passed through the hands of a
prior holder.

James R. Bliss, S.Ed.

{1864), where the "intermediate indorser'' had in fact signed for the accommodation
of the payee, action by the latter against the former was allowed. See Herrick v. Carman, 12 Johns. (N.Y.) 159 {1815) and Howe Mach. Co. v. Hadden, (C.C. Ind.
1878) 8 Biss. 208, Fed. Cas. No. 6785.
9 Section 66 would lead to the same result in the case of a general indorsement.
10 Holding the indorser: West Boston Savings Bank v. Thompson, 124 Mass. 506
(1878). Releasing the indorser: Howe Mach. Co. v. Hadden, (C.C. Ind. 1878) 8
Biss. 208, Fed. Cas. No. 678 5; Adrian v. McCaskill, 103 N.C. 182, 9 S.E. 284
{1889).
11 Holding the indorser: Persky v. Bank of America, 235 App. Div. 146, 256
N.Y.S. 572 (1932), reversed on other grounds, 261 1-f.Y. 212, 185 N.E. 77 {1933);
State Finance Corp. v. Pistorino, 245 Mass. 402, 139 N.E. 653 (1923). Releasing
the indorser: Ray v. Livingston, 204 N.C. 1, 167 S.E._496 (1933), noted in 17
MINN. L. REv. 808 (1933), criticized by Beutel in BRANNAN's NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw ANNOTATED 531-2 (1938).
12 The obligation is voluntarily assumed in the sense that the law recognizes qualified
indorsements.

